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AN ISLAND IN THE NET: DOMAIN
NAMING AND ENGLISH
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
by MARK GoULDt
I.

INTRODUCTION

Most users of the Internet do not possess a domain name. Nonetheless, as domain naming is one of the essential prerequisites of an Internet service all users benefit directly from the existence of the domain
name system ("DNS"). The universal nature of the DNS also means that
it may be perceived as a mechanism by which those who abuse the Internet may be subjected to a sanction. This article explores the ways in
which the United Kingdom national domain registry may be encouraged
to enforce rules of "netiquette" or to recognize, by the use of public law
remedies, trademark or other legal rights relating to the registration of
domain names.
II. NOMINET: THE U.K DOMAIN REGISTRY
Since July 1, 1996, the ".uk" top level domain has been administered
by Nominet UK, a private company limited by guarantee.1 Before this
date, domain registration in the United Kingdom including the provision
of root servers was administered voluntarily by the United Kingdom Education and Research Networking Association ("UKERNA") and a group
of Internet Service Providers ("ISP"s), and the .uk domain was persont Lecturer in Law, University of Bristol. This article is part of a larger work in progress which explores the regulatory and constitutional framework for the Internet.
1. Most of this section draws on information published on Nominet's Web site at
<http://www.nic.uk/> Nominet U.K: An Introduction (visited Dec. 14, 1996) <http://
www.nic.uk/nominet/backg.html> [hereinafter Nominet, Introduction] (providing background on Nominet). Memorandum and Articles of Association (last modified May 24,
1996) <httpJ/www.nic.uk/nominet/intro.html> [hereinafter Articles of Association] (providing information about the structure of Nominet). Memorandum of Association (last modified May 14, 1996) <httpJ/www.nic.uk/nominet/mems.html>; Articles of Association (last
modified May 14, 1996) <httpJ/www.nic.uklnominet/arts.html>.
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ally delegated to Dr. William Black, an employee of UKERNA. 2 Dr.
Black is now managing director of Nominet. The .uk domain is divided
into a number of sub-domains including the following: .co.uk, intended
for commercial use; .org.uk, available for non-profit organizations; .ac.uk,
used by educational institutions (apart from schools, which are registered under .sch.uk); and, .gov.uk, in which governmental components
are registered. 3 UKERNA retains a delegated responsibility for registrations in the .ac.uk and .gov.uk sub-domains. 4 UKERNA is a company
which was set up in 1993 to manage the United Kingdom's academic network and to implement the policy of the Joint Information Systems Committee of the Higher Education Funding Councils, and as such clearly
discharges a governmental function. Since the sub-domains for which
UKERNA is responsible are less likely to give rise to disputes, this article will concentrate on the obligations owed by Nominet. Some of the
points asserted will, however, be relevant to UKERNA.
The Domain Name System is defined by a core Internet standard:
STD 13. s This describes a hierarchical and distributed database within
which the names of Internet hosts and their correlative Internet Protocol
("IP') numbers are stored. The hierarchy requires a number of top-level
domains ("TLD"s). These are of two types.6 International Top Level Domains ("iTLD"s), such as .com, .net, and .org are administered by Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI") on behalf of the InterNIC, which is in turn a
"cooperative activity between the National Science Foundation, Network
Solutions, Inc. and AT&T." 7 Alongside with iTLDs, are a number of
2. See UKERNA NEWS, (Oct. 1996) <httpj/www.ukerna.ac.uk/documents
/
UKERNANews/1996/october/UKERNANews.html>; Nominet, Introduction, supra note
1.
3. There are, at the time of writing, 11 sub-domains under .uk. Nominet UK, Domain
Names within the U.K. (visited Dec. 14, 1996) <http'//www.nic.uk/new/domains.html>.
They are not all in use at present.
4. UKERNA, Procedureand Chargingfor GainingNames in the AC. UK and GOV.UK
Domains (last modified Nov. 26, 1996) <http'//www.tech.ukerna.ac.uk/operations/documents/naming/names-ac-gov.html> (providing information about this function).
UKERNA currently charges a flat fee of £100 for registering a domain under .ac.uk or

.gov.uk. Id.
5. STD 13 actually includes two Requests for Comments ("RFC"s): Paul Mockapetris,
Domain Names-Concepts and Facilities,RFC 1034 (1987) and Paul Mockapetris, Domain
Names-Implementation and Specification, RFC 1035 (1987). RFCs and STDs are widely

available in print and electronic form; for a definitive index see <httptl/ds.internic.net/ds/
dspglintdoc.html>.
6. Jon Postel, Domain Name System Structure and Delegation (RFC 1591, 1994)
[hereinafter RFC 1591].

7. InterNIC's home page (visited Dec. 14, 1996) <http'/is.internic.net/>. Three other
non-country TLDs (.gov, .edu, and .mil) are retained for United State's use only. A seventh
iTLD, .int, is administered by the International Telecommunication Union ("ITtJ") and provides domains for true international organizations.
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TLDs corresponding to the two-letter country codes designated in the International Organization for Standardization's ISO-3166.8 These are
delegated by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority ("LANA") on an
ad hoc basis.9 Subject to IANA delegation, the rules governing the registration of named domains under the TLDs are made and administered
only by the manager of the TLD. Those managers may make a number
of choices about sub-domains and rules for naming which need not refer
to the policies and rules of any other domain provided they do not break
the DNS Request for Comments ("RFC"s). 10
Nominet inherited a TLD which already contained a large number of
registered domain names within a range of sub-domains. All of those
registrations had been made without cost to the registrant. The creation
of a single body responsible for the administration of the majority of the
.uk sub-domains permitted a more formal structure to be imposed on the
domain registration process and enabled a charge to be levied for domain
registration. Nominet based this charge on its costs that include, among
other things, a root server for the .uk domain as well as an WHOIS
server." Consequently, all registrations since August 1, 1996 in the
sub-domains administered by Nominet have been subject to a charge of
£100 for the first two years of registration, to be followed by an annual
fee of no more than £50 for subsequent years in which the registration is
maintained.12

The billing system, however, is not as straightforward as it first appears. Nominet is open to membership by organizations, companies or
8. There are, in fact, three exceptions to this assertion. The ISO-3166 code for the
United Kingdom is actually GB. In addition, IANA permitted the allocation of TLDs to the
Channel Islands of Jersey and Guernsey which do not currently have ISO country codes.
According to information published by Island Networks Ltd., who administer the new domains, the codes chosen (.je and .gg) correspond to codes reserved in ISO-3166 for Jersey
and Guernsey. Island Networks Ltd., Channel Isles Name Registry Launched (last modified Aug. 14, 1996) <http'/www.isles.net/pr960809.html>; Island Networks Ltd., Island
Networks Background Information FAQ (last modified Sept. 7, 1996) <http://
www.isles.net/bgfaq.html>.
9. The principles for the delegation of TLDs are described in RFC 1591 and more
generally in Jon Postel, LANA Policy on Delegated Domains (last modified Oct. 21, 1993)
<ftpJ/rsinternic.net/rfc/iana.top.level.domain.policy>.
10. Thus, the .uk domain has developed a detailed set of rules governing allocation of
domain names within sub-domains, whereas the .de domain is used in a "flat" fashionwith all domain names appearing directly under .de. Deutsches-Network Information
Center (visited Dec. 14, 1996) <httpJ/www.nic.de/>.
11. The WHOIS command allows the searching of information about registrations held
in the DNS directory. See G. Kessler & S. Shepard, A Primeron Internet and TCP/IP Tools
(RFC 1739, 1994); Paul Mockapetris, Directory Services, in INTERNET SYSTEM HANDBOOK
469 (Daniel C. Lynch et al., 1993).
12. Nominet UK, Pricing(visited Dec. 14, 1996) <http/www.nic.uk/nominet/charges/
prices.html>.
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individuals, by paying an annual fee. 13 These members are entitled to a
40% discount on the cost of domain registration in exchange for responsibility for billing their customers (who would actually own the domain
names). The cost of subscribing to Nominet may depend on the number
of domain registrations undertaken during a qualifying period. Thus,
presently, those who registered domains between April 1, 1995 and
March 31, 1996 should pay a subscription fee according to Table 1.14
Those who do not qualify under this criterion are permitted to subscribe
at the minimum rate only. Subscribers at the higher rates are entitled to
additional voting rights at company meetings.
TABLE 1: CATEGORIES OF NOMINET MEMBERSHIP 1 5

DOMAINS

VOTES

REGISTERED

SUBSCRIPTION
FEE

fewer than 50

1

£500

50-99
100-199

2
4

£1000
£2000

200-299

6

£3000

300-399

8

£4000

10

£5000

more than 400

This arrangement suggests that members of Nominet act as
Nominet's agents in the execution of contracts for domain registration.
This is confirmed by the terms and conditions of Nominet's contract to
provide domain registration. The first clause of the terms and conditions
states:
It is recognized that Nominet UK will have recourse to the ISP in the
first instance for the payment of the fees and delivery of the signed contract. However, the Applicant should note that the ISP is not a party to
16
this contract and the ultimate responsibility rests with the applicant.
Thus, apart from their part in the governance of Nominet, the only function of the members of the company is to reduce the load on Nominet's
administration by taking responsibility for billing and other financial
matters. In return for this function, they enjoy privileged access to do13. Nominet, Introduction, supra note 1.
14. See Articles of Association, supra note 1 (suggesting that Nominet's Article 19 provides for a qualifying period that will remain in place until August 31, 1997, whereafter
subscriptions and voting rights "will be related to the member's relative commercial in-

volvement in the ,uk domain service").
15. See Nominet, Introduction, supra note 1.

16. Nominet UK Terms and Conditions (last modified Sept. 16, 1996) <http://
www.nic.uk/nominet/terms.html> [hereinafter Terms].
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main registration. Non-members may register domain names directly
with Nominet, but are expected to pay the full cost of registration.17
The policies followed by Nominet in allocating domain names reflect
conventions established prior to its existence, but do not appear to take
into account the difficulties faced by NSI in relation to disputes between
trademarks and domain names, which have led to a comprehensive, if
not uncontroversial, domain name dispute policy.' 8 Nominet's policies
were prepared by a technical working group prior to approval by the
company's Steering Committee. 19 The policies fall into two categories.
The first consists of the rules governing selection of a domain name and
conditions for registration, and the second concerns the conditions under
which a domain may be suspended or withdrawn. 20 The technical working group originally proposed rules for the registration of domain names
ranging in character from the technical to the quasi-legal.
Nominet's current policy shies away from the less technical rules.
Thus, there is a ban on the future registration of domain names which
consist of only two letters. 2 1 The justification for this rule is to avoid
confusion with the ISO-3166 country codes. 22 A similar justification applies to the ban on the use of other iTLD suffixes-net.org.uk, com.ac.uk,
and mil.co.uk will not be registered. These restrictions minimize the
DNS lockup problems which might occur with badly configured domain
name servers. The technical requirement that there be two nameservers
available for the domain name at the time of registration is imposed for
23
similar reasons.
17. It is likely that very few non-members will wish to register domain names directly
with Nominet, given that the marginal cost of membership becomes minimal after only a
few names have been registered and that Nominet members may offer a value-added domain service for those who only wish to register one or two domains.
18. NSI, Domain Name Dispute Policy (last modified Sept. 9, 1996) <ftp://
rs.internic.net/policy/internic.domain.policy>.
19. UKNIC DNS, Technical Working Group, Proposalsfor Technical Requirements of
Naming Function (visited Oct. 29, 1996) <httpI/www.nic.uk/proposals/dns-tech-wg.txt>
[hereinafter Proposals].
20. Nominet UK, Rules for the .UK domain and sub-domains (last modified July 25,
1996) <http://www.nic.uk/rules/rup2.html> (providing the current rules) [hereinafter
Nominet, Rules]. Additional rules apply to the .co.uk sub-domain. Nominet U-K, Rules for
the CO. UK domain (modified July 25, 1996) <http:/www.nic.uk/rules/rup3.html>. Also,
additional rules apply to .ltd.uk and .plc.uk sub-domains. Nominet UK, Rules for the ltd.uk
and .plc.uk domains (last modified Sept. 25, 1996) <http'/www.nic.uk/rules/rupl.htm>.

21. The domain bt.co.uk was registered before Nominet came into being. It and similar domains are explicitly allowed to continue in existence until their domain owner relinquishes them or until some other factor requires that their registration be terminated or
suspended.
22. Nominet, Rules, supra note 20, pt. 3.
23. Id. As yet, Nominet has not had to invoke an automatic check for lame delegations
in the way envisaged in InterNIC. The InterNICLame Delegation Policy-DRAFT(visited
Dec. 15, 1996) <ftp:/rs.internic.net/policy/internic/internic-domain-5.txt>.
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At the other extreme, the working group originally proposed that
domain names containing sequences of letters making up a "rude" or
otherwise contentious word would be rejected. 24 When Nominet's Steering Committee met on July 25, 1996, it decided that the exclusion of "potentially offensive" words was too subjective a requirement, and,
therefore they did not carry the rule forward into the published policy. 25
A more significant omission is the absence of provisions on trademarks
and domain names. Nominet simply registers domain names which comply with the technical requirements on a first come, first served basis.
Whilst the rules for the acquisition of domain names are primarily
technically-based, and permit little discretion on Nominet's part, the
conditions for the suspension or withdrawal of a domain name are much
more vague. These conditions are found in two places-in the rules for
the .uk domain and in Nominet's standard terms and conditions. The
latter document is primarily intended to protect Nominet from legal action and provides that:
either party may cancel a registration in exceptional circumstances by
notice in writing to the other. In the case of a cancellation by
NOMINET UK, such circumstances include, in particular, where to
maintain the registration would put Nominet in conflict with statutory
obligations or the terms of a Court Order, or where NOMINET UK reathat the registration infringes the legal rights of a
sonably believes
26
third party.

In the domain rules, a number of circumstances are listed which
would entitle Nominet to withdraw or suspend delegation of a domain
name. These again include technical concerns, such as "if the name is
administered in such a way as to endanger operation of the DNS," but
also encompass non-technical matters, such as the name "being used in a
manner likely to cause confusion to Internet users" or the commencement of legal action regarding the use of the name. 2 7 The rules also allow withdrawal or suspension "where Nominet UK is of the opinion that
one of the above events is likely to occur."28 Unless Nominet is responding to a court order, there is no guarantee in any of its documents or
policies as to the propriety of the procedures which might be used to
withdraw or suspend a domain name. How might that procedural or,
indeed, substantive propriety be ensured? Before turning to that question, it is useful to examine the place of domain registries in a system of
Internet regulation. This in turn resolves into two issues: is domain re24.
25.
(visited
26.
27.
28.

Proposals, supra note 19, 4.
Nominet UK Resolution 2, Minutes of the FirstMeeting of the Steering Committee
Dec. 15, 1996), <http'//www.nic.uk/nominet/agm/agmmins.html>.
Terms, supra note 16, cl.5.3.
Nominet, Rules, supra note 20, pt. 3.
Id.
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gistration a private or public function and what obligations may be legitimately imposed on domain registries?
III.

IS DOMAIN REGISTRATION A PURELY PRIVATE
FUNCTION?

Apparently Nominet in common with other domain registries, which
tend to operate similar policies, adheres to the view that it is exercising a
private function within a largely private networking system. If this is
true, it would be pointless to investigate the possibility of external obligations being imposed on domain registries. Conversely, if domain registration is one of a range of public functions within a network that has
become ubiquitous, then we might be justified in seeking to identify the
demands which may be made of such functions.
A.

THE EXTREMES ON THE CONTINUUM OF PRIVATE & PUBLIC
FUNCTIONS

There is no clear distinction between public and private functions,
nor is it necessarily the case that a public function must be regulated by
an external body. It is straightforward to locate certain activities in the
public domain, such as the creation of constitutions or legislative or judicial rules within the context of the organization of a nation-state, because they will create general and inalienable obligations. Equally, it is
not difficult to see that interactions between persons (whether natural or
legal) where no other parties are concerned are rightly private to those
persons.
B.

OTHER FUNCTIONS ON THE CONTINUUM

The act of placing other functions and activities on the continuum
between those two extremes may be inherently difficult. For example,
the state may also be a landowner. Is the disposition of that land a private function which is outside the normal methods of state regulation
(but clearly within the general rules governing such transactions), or
should it be treated as an exercise of public power and regulated accordingly? The answer may depend on the behavior of the state actor. In
Wheeler v. Leicester City Council,2 9 a local authority's decision which forbade a rugby club from continuing to practice on the city's sports fields
because three of the players had played in South Africa, was quashed on
the grounds that the council had no power to punish the club for its players' behavior. Private landowners have no such fetters on their discre29. Wheeler v. Leicester City Council, [1985] App. Cas. 1054 (appeal taken from Eng.).
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tion.30 A public body is thus constrained in what it can do by the powers
which have been conferred upon it.
For some bodies, these constraints may be minimal. In the United
Kingdom, for example, ministers of the crown are able to rely on the
royal prerogative as a source of power that, although limited in scope by
the judiciary, 3 1 is sufficiently open to interpretation to allow a degree of
flexibility which may enable the statutory allocation of responsibilities to
be ignored. 32 Likewise, the powers enjoyed under the common law generally will be less clearly circumscribed than those that are derived from
33
prerogative or statute.
In the same way that the state may be more akin to a private actor
in some circumstances, it may be seen that some private institutions
may exercise powers which have a public character. Some of these are
regulatory bodies. 34 Others are more closely aligned with the state
itself 3 5

In addition to bodies which are closely related to government by virtue of a funding relationship or by the power of ministers to appoint their
members, 3 6 some institutions which are even more remote from government may have an influence in the public sphere. 37 Perhaps, treating all
of these types of bodies as exercising public functions of one sort or another is appropriate, but public character does not necessarily lead to
regulation as a matter of course.
30. See H.W.R. WADE & C.F. FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATrVE LAW 391-92 (7th ed. 1994)

[hereinafter WADE & FoRSYrH].
31. See Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [19851 App.
Cas. 374 (appeal taken from Eng.).
32. R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Northumbria Police
Authority, 1989 Q.B. 26 (Eng. CA. 1987), the prerogative power to keep peace in the realm
was interpreted to allow the Home Secretary to issue baton rounds and CS gas to a police
force despite the fact that the police authority which had statutory responsibility for the
force had refused its permission.
33. See B.V. Harris, The 'Third Source' of Authority for Government Action, 108 L.Q.
REV. 626 (1992).
34. In the legal field, for example, the Law Society has the function of regulating the
solicitors' profession and the General Council of the Bar fulfills the same function for
barristers.
35. This intermingling of public and private functions is summarized in IAN HARDEN &
NoRMAN LEwIs, THE NOBLE LIE: THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE OF LAw 56-62

(1986).
36. See GRANT JORDAN, THE BRITISH ADMINIsTRATvE SYSTEM: PRINCIPLES VERSUS PRAcTICE 32-44 (1994) [hereinafter, JORDAN] (discussing other means constituting a close governmental relationship).
37. Such institutions may be termed para-governmental organizations. DELIVERING
PUBLIC SERVICES IN WESTERN EUROPE: SHARING WESTERN EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE OF PARA-

GOvERNmENT ORGANIZATION (Christopher Hood & Gunnar Folke Schuppert eds., 1988).
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C.

THREE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR GovERNMENT REGULATION

Grant Jordan has identified three justifications for governmental intervention to regulate otherwise market-driven activities.38 These justifications follow: (1) in the event of market failure or where the "shortrun benefits of competition are outweighed by longer-run costs;" (2)
where there is a need for regulation to prevent behavior which would
discredit the idea of the market or to provide a framework for efficient
competition; and (3) where free operation of the market might have
harmful externalities. 3 9 In the absence of explicit governmental action
to regulate private activities, the courts could also undertake regulation
40
where appropriate.
If we adhere to Jordan's threefold justification for regulation, the
task to confirm that the activities of Internet institutions have a public
character and that they are suitable for regulation is relatively straightforward. We may, however, be less confident about the proper locus for
that regulation. Although the market in network standards has not
failed (since there is no compulsion to use the Internet Protocols), the
Internet has become the prevailing network protocol for a variety of purposes. It may be necessary for the de facto monopoly in Internet standards to be subjected to some form of regulation. Likewise, it is possible
that decisions taken about the network (such as decisions relating to IP
number allocation, domain registry or routing priorities) are likely to
have both positive and negative externalities. 4 1 If commercial interests
are to be balanced with the public interest on a global scale, necessarily
one should consider where such a balance or regulation should take
place. The Internet is currently "governed" by a range of institutions,
such as at central regestries (the Internet Society ("ISOCM), the Internet
Engineering Task Force ("IETF") and IANA), at regional IP registries
(InterNIC for the Americas, RIPE-NCC for Europe, and APNIC for Asia
and the Pacific Rim), and at national domain registries at the periphery.
For the most part, this system of governance has worked well in the past,
but the growth of the Internet from an essentially private system into a
major international infrastructure on which a range of commercial activto
ities rely heavily means that serious consideration must now be given
42
formal regulation according to established constitutional principles.
38. JORDAN, supranote 36, at 185-86 (deriving its analysis from WYN GRANT,BusIHEss
AND POLrIcs IN BRITAIN 1-2 (1987)).
39. JORDAN,supra note 36, at 186.

40. See infra Part V.
41. COORDINATION OF THE INTERNET (Brian Kahin & James Keller eds., forthcoming

1997) (exploring these issues).
42. Mark Gould, Governanceof the Internet:A UK Perspective, in COORDINATION OF THE

(Brian Kahin & James Keller eds., forthcoming 1997) (exploring these issues).
The nature of those principles is outside the scope of this article.
INTERNET
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There are good reasons for keeping any system of formal regulation
within the context of the existing Internet institutions rather than relying on national judicial or regulatory frameworks. In the first place, the
efficient operation of the network is an essential consideration in such
regulation-it would be unwise to ignore the purposes for which the network was designed when addressing issues of its regulation. The operation of the network is best understood by those who are most familiar
with it. Further, if the network is regulated in different ways in different
countries, then there is a risk of regulatory arbitrage 43 or of a lack of
harmony in the development of the network across the world.
The European Community has responded to similar risks by centralizing its dispute resolution and legislative functions. 4 4 In addition, the
45
European Court of Justice has developed the doctrines of direct effect
and primacy of Community law46 to prevent national interests in regulation from interfering with those matters which are properly regulated by
Community law.
In a similar fashion, the Internet would be most efficiently regulated
by centralized institutions. However, where a specific regulatory mechanism is currently absent from the Internet system, national institutions
must be able to fill the gap. Otherwise, there is a risk that genuine
grievances would not be redressed.
Given the lack of a dispute-resolution mechanism within the Internet structure at present, litigants are turning to national courts for
the resolution of their Internet-related disputes. The disputes are concerned primarily with the registration of domain names which conflict
with trademark rights. 4 7 Where a domain registry is more closely linked
with a geographical territory than the iTLDs, the jurisdiction of the
courts in that territory to decide disputes relating to those domain
names should be less controversial. Curiously, it might actually be in
the interests of those who wish to promote the merits of IP and the architectural principles of the Internet 48 to submit to a degree of regulation,
since the process of creating a national information infrastructure will
43. See Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, in BoRDERS IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE

(Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., forthcoming 1997).
44. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUITY, Feb. 7, 1992, arts. 177 &

189, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573.
45. See, e.g., Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105; Case 152184, Marshall v. Southampton & S.-W.
Hampshire Area Health Authority (Teaching), 1986 E.C.R. 723, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 688.
46. Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425 (1964).
47. See generally Kenneth Sutherlin Decker, Note, Trademark Law Lost in Cyberspace: Trademark Protectionfor Internet Addresses, 9 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 483 (1996).
48. See Brian Carpenter, Architectural Principlesof the Internet (RFC 1958, 1996).
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inevitably require some regulatory convergence. 4 9 Without representation in that process of convergence, the interests of the Internet community are likely to be ignored.
IV.

WHAT OBLIGATIONS MIGHT BE IMPOSED ON DOMAIN
REGISTRIES?

If it is accepted that domain registration is a suitable matter for regulation (whether judicial or governmental), it is necessary to ascertain
what the domain registry might be required to do as part of that regulation. Further, it is necessary for the putative regulator to recognize that
the domain registry operates as part of a wider enterprise, and therefore
to take account of two, possibly competing, conceptions of the "public interest." In addition to the public interest which is rooted in the national
constitution or system of governance, domain registration must fit with
the requirement of network efficiency which underpins the Internet "constitution." Otherwise, its exercise of power will not be legitimate. What,
therefore, should a domain registry be required to do to comply with
these constitutional interests?
The answers to this question may depend on the standpoint of the
questioner. From an objective perspective, however, it must be a minimal requirement that registries adhere to their published policies, and to
the procedures outlined therein as a matter of legal certainty. Where
there are no clear procedures, it is appropriate to consider what kind of
processes should be used or what the proper principles might be to determine those processes. Further, domain registries will not be allowed to
violate the law. However, exactly what is required by the law will depend on the degree to which the functions of domain registration may be
characterized as public or private. To explore these questions, it will be
50
helpful to use the following scenarios:
Scenario 1
Widget Ltd., decides to obtain a domain name for its commercial use.
Having found that the domains widget.com and widget.co.uk, have already been taken, the company decides to apply for widget.org.uk.
Nominet registers that domain, with Widget Ltd. as the owner.

49. HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION
SOCIETY: AGENDA FOR ACTION IN THE UK 4.203 (HL 77, 1995-96) (suggesting that "[flull

exploitation of the broadband superhighway would probably require the involvement of
over a dozen regulatory bodies in the United Kingdom").
50. These examples are hypothetical; none of the domains discussed were registered
at the time of writing.
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Scenario 2
The law firm, Smith & Jones, applies for the domain
smithjones.co.uk. Nominet registers the domain, but at a later date it
discovers that there is no nameserver for the domain.
Scenario 3
An Internet Service Provider ("ISPCO") registers the domain
isp.net.uk, and starts to register customer hostnames under that
domain.
Scenario 4
Spamco, a marketing company, registers the domain spamco.co.uk.
Spamco begins by using that domain for unsolicited commercial e-mail.
When other Internet users complain, it becomes clear that there is no
postmaster account for the domain and that the contact details for the
domain owner held in Nominet's database are no longer valid.
These situations raise a variety of issues, some of which constitute a
breach of Nominet's published policies, whilst others infringe wider conceptions of network etiquette. How should Nominet proceed when faced
with a complaint raising these wider issues? What principles should it
consider when making decisions on such matters?
A.

SCENARIO 1

In the first scenario, there is an apparent breach of the rules governing the sub-domains. Nominet states that "The org.uk domain is intended to be a domain for those organizations which do not satisfactorily
'fit' into any of the other sub-domains of uk. This includes, charities,
trades unions, political parties, community groups, educational councils,
professional institutions, etc."5 1 However, this statement is not part of

the rules for the domain, which are as follows: "Only 1 domain per organization/body name; The name should reflect the name of the requesting
organization; Min-inimum of three characters without human intervenof the
tion; At least 2 nameservers serving the name within 24 hours
52
request; Subject to the above criteria, first come first served."
On the face of it, there is no requirement to prove that an organization requesting a domain name under .org.uk is legitimately entitled to
do so. However, if one reads the description of the sub-domain together
with the general rules on the .uk domain, and specifically the provision
that "Nominet UK may withdraw or suspend delegation of a name;... if
it is drawn to Nominet UK's attention that the name is being used in a
manner likely to cause confusion to Internet users,"5 3 one might con51. Nominet UK, The org.uk domain (last modified Sept. 1, 1996) <http://www.nic.uk/
org/orguk.html>.
52. Id.
53. Nominet, Rules, supra note 20, pt. 3.
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clude that Nominet would be entitled to refuse to register widget.org.uk
for a commercial entity. To do otherwise would render the use of subdomains otiose. It could also be argued that registration of a non-commercial domain by a company with commercial objects would be a breach
54
of United Kingdom's company law.

If there is a reasonable expectation that Nominet would refuse to
register a domain name in the "wrong" sub-domain, how is the registry to
reach the decision that a potential registrant is not entitled to use that
sub-domain? As a private organization, Nominet is free to refuse to contract with any potential registrant. If, however, one takes the view that
Nominet exercises a public or monopoly power it may be correct to impose a special obligation to investigate all claims for registration before
arriving at a decision to contract or not to contract. In particular, it may
be deemed appropriate to involve potential registrants in the decisionmaking process by allowing them to make representations as to their
entitlement to a domain name in a particular form. Inevitably, such participation will increase the costs of the decision-making process.
B.

SCENARIO

2

The second scenario fits more neatly with Nominet's preference for
technical rules governing registration. In particular, the failure to provide nameservers once the domain name has been registered falls afoul
of the requirement to administer the name "in a way likely to endanger
operation of the DNS"55 and would also entitle Nominet to suspend or
withdraw delegation on the ground that "the basis on which the name
was registered has changed."5 6 Despite this, it is still not clear what
procedures should be followed, either when taking the decision to withdraw or suspend the domain name or in the resolution of the (possibly
inevitable) dispute. Further, it is less than clear in this or the earlier
scenario whether, and under what conditions, third parties would be able
to invoke Nominet's power to withdraw or suspend delegation.
C.

SCENARIO

3

The vagueness of Nominet's own rules may be contrasted with the
clarity of some RFCs. As an example, RFC 1591 provides that the .net
iTLD, "is intended to hold only the computers of network providers, that
is the NIC and NOC computers, the administrative computers, and the
network node computers. The customers of the network provider would
54. Companies Act 1985, §§ 348-51. A limited company is required to make its status
clear on all significant publications. Id. Whether the courts would treat registration of a
.org.uk domain as a breach of the spirit of those rules is moot. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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have domain names of their own not in the NET TLD."5 7

Nominet borrowed this rule explicitly when establishing the .net.uk
sub-domain.5 8 It is also given the status of a rule, unlike the more vague
standards applied in the .org.uk sub-domain. On this basis, it would be
much more straightforward for the domain in the third scenario to be
refused, or for it to be withdrawn or suspended. There are still some
evidentiary problems, however. So long as ISPCO uses the ispco.net.uk
name for its own computers, it will remain within the terms of the rules
governing registration in the .net.uk sub-domain. Given that the domain
name does not exist and individual hostnames cannot therefore be registered in the DNS until the domain name itself is registered, the circumstances which might lead to a breach of the naming rules can only come
into existence once the domain has been registered. At that point, given
that there exists a contract between Nominet and ISPCO, the use of the
domain name would have to fall outside the contract so that Nominet
exercises its power to withdraw or suspend delegation. Is that decision
simply a matter for Nominet?
Reading the terms and conditions together with the naming rules
would suggest that it is a matter for Nominet. Nominet is permitted to
withdraw or suspend delegation "where [it] is of the opinion that one of
the [qualifying] events is likely to occur." 59 One of the qualifying events
is the name "being used in a manner likely to cause confusion to Internet users."6 0 Nominet is therefore placed in a position of great power,
since it alone appears to be responsible for assessing the conditions
which would lead to a repudiation of the contract. The fact that suspending the domain name would have consequences for third parties,
i.e., those customers of ISPCO who had registered hostnames under the
disputed domain name, would not appear to be a concern for Nominet
who "accepts no responsibility for the use of any domain name." 6 1
Should Nominet be allowed to disclaim any responsibility for innocent
third parties?
D. SCENARIO 4
The final scenario is perhaps the most difficult for Nominet. It involves a breach of an Internet standard, albeit one which is not related to
the DNS. RFC 822 62 (which is incorporated into STD 11) requires that
57. RFC 1591, supra note 6, pt. 2.
58. Nominet UK, Naming Administration for the .NET UK Domain (visited Dec. 17,

1996) <http://www.nic.uklnet.uk.html>.
59. Nominet, Rules, supra note 20, pt. 3.
60. Nominet, Rules, supra note 20, pt. 3.
61. Terms, supra note 16, cl. 5.4.
62. David H. Crocker, Standardfor the Format of ARPA Internet Text Messages, $ 6.3
(RFC 822, 1982).
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the address, postmaster@domain, must be valid and routed to a person
or group of people so that queries may be addressed to a site without
knowing any of the mailnames at the site. Failure to adhere to this rule
can cause problems at a human level, but may also be risky for computers. 63 If Nominet were minded to enforce this rule, difficulties might
arise in regard to giving notice. Without accurate contact details (and
there is no suggestion that it maintains a constant check on the accuracy
of changes made to domains), Nominet would find it hard to give notice of
any change in the status of the domain name. 64 From the perspective of
Internet users whose mailboxes might be filled with unsolicited e-mail
from Spamco and of ISPs who would have to incur the costs of handling
that e-mail, it would seem obvious that without a legal remedy the only
sanction would lie with the domain registration authority and Spamco's
connectivity provider. If the provider cannot be identified with certainty,
or is unwilling to terminate a customers account at the instigation of a
third party, it is likely that Nominet would bear the brunt of these
complaints.
If Nominet is a private actor within the Internet system, there may
be little that third parties can do to require it to adhere to standards of
decision-making and enforcement of netiquette and other rules. If, however, the courts take the view that it is in fact in a position of public
power, then third parties may be able to enforce Nominet's public duties.
Before assessing the likelihood that the English courts might take this
step, an outline of the judicial context is appropriate.
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IN
ENGLISH LAW
Disputes between Nominet and domain owners will naturally be resolved according to the law of contract. Contractual remedies are not
available to third parties who may have a legitimate grievance against
Nominet. Similarly, there may be some remedies which are not available in contract at all, but which a domain owner may wish to use. In the
event of failure of a contractual claim, it is likely that litigants will turn
to the principles developed by the courts under the head of judicial review. In England, judicial review of administrative action is a creation of
the common law. The current procedures have been derived from the
supervisory power of higher courts over inferior courts and tribunals,
63. See, for example, the description of "SMTP chicken" in Mark Gould, Rules in the
Virtual Society, 10 INT'L REV. L. CoMPuTERs & TECH. 199, 207-8 (1996).

64. There is a problem with this scenario. It is not necessary to have a domain name to
send e-mail messages. All that is required is a computer with an IP number, connected to
the network. From a commercial perspective, however, the permanence of a domain name
is more meaningful than a changeable IP number.
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which became the exclusive jurisdiction of the King's Bench, applying
the prerogative writs of prohibition, mandamus and certiorari, as well as
a variety of other remedies, each with its own rules of procedure. 65 In
1977, a unified procedure was created, and called the "application for
judicial review". It is now to be found in Order 53 of the Rules of the
Supreme Court, 66 and in section 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981.67
The judicial review process now strives to balance private rights with the
public interest in good and efficient decision-making by a variety of
means.
For the most part, the balancing of public and private interests is
also a balance between the procedural and substantive requirements of
judicial review. Generally speaking, the substantive grounds on which
judicial review is available require a higher standard of decision-making
than might be required of private bodies. In return for these controls,
bodies which are susceptible to judicial review are protected from applicants using the process in an unduly restrictive fashion. Thus, Order 53
provides a two-stage process which is designed to filter out the less wellfounded applications. Before proceeding to the application for judicial
review proper, applicants must first obtain leave to apply for judicial
68
review.
The leave requirement requires a judge to examine the prima facie
merits of the application based primarily on an affidavit provided by the
applicant and to decide whether the application should proceed to a full
hearing. 69 One of the questions which may be resolved at the leave stage
is the question whether the applicant has a sufficient interest, or standing, to bring the application. 70 Where it is impossible to separate this
question from consideration of the merits of the application itself, the
71
court may leave it to be decided together with the merits.
Whilst the standing requirement may appear to be a restriction on
the availability of judicial review, it is only restrictive insofar as it pre65. See J.H. BAiKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 164-175 (3d ed.
1990)
66. Rules of the Supreme Court (Revision) 1965, S.I. 1965, No. 1776; as amended by
S.I. 1977, No. 1955 and S.I. 1980, No. 2000 [hereinafter Order 53].
67. See generally Patrick Elias, Remedies in Administrative Law-A Less than Modest
Reform, 205 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 1978; Louis Blom-Cooper, The New Face of JudicialReview:
Administrative Changes in Order 53, 1982 PUB L. 250 (discussing accounts of the reforms
of 1977 and 1980-81).
68. Supreme Court Act 1981, § 31(3); Order 53, supra note 66, rule 3(1).
69. The leave requirement is controversial. It is thought by some to be an unjustified
restriction on the availability ofjudicial review. See Andrew Le Sueur & Maurice Sunkin,
Applications for JudicialReview: The Requirement of Leave, 1992 PuB. L. 102.
70. Supreme Court Act 1981, § 31(3); Order 53, supra note 66, rule 3(7).
71. R. v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs, exparte Nat'l Fed'n of Self-Employed & Small Businesses Ltd., 1982 App. Cas. 617 (appeal taken from Eng.).

1997]

DOMAIN NAMING AND NOMINET

vents any member of the public from invoking the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction. Providing some real proximity of interest can be
shown, the court will recognize the applicant's standing. It may still be
difficult for individuals to challenge the decisions of public bodies except
where they have a personal interest in the challenged decision, but the
courts have recognized that pressure groups may have a legitimate gen72
eral claim to bring actions where appropriate.
A final limitation on the availability of judicial review is the requirement that applications for judicial review must be brought within three
months of the grounds for the application first arising. 73 This requirement is imposed for the benefit of the public body whose decisions might
otherwise be left uncertain for too long, but the right of third parties not
74
to be unduly affected by such uncertainty is also recognized.
The judicial review procedure offers a range of remedies, and also
permits the court to provide a remedy which was not sought in the original application. 75 The former prerogative writs have been transformed
into the prerogative orders. Where a public power is abused, or exercised
ultra vires, an order of certiorari will quash any decision made, and an
order of prohibition will operate to prevent future wrong-doing. Mandamus, used to enforce the performance of a public duty according to law,
was historically a residual remedy, and only available where no other
legal remedy existed. 76 This led to the remedy being overshadowed by
the other prerogative writs, until the reforms of the judicial review process brought its renascence. Mandamus now forms a valuable means of
preventing wrongful inaction, thus complementing prohibition and certiorari, which are concerned with wrongful actions. The utility of the prerogative orders is reinforced by the power of the courts to combine them
with relief by way of declaration, injunction or damages. 7 7 The remedies
available by way of judicial review are clearly comprehensive. However,
72. See Equal Opportunities Comm'n v. Secretary of State for Employment, 1995 App.

Cas. 1 (appeal taken from Eng.) (standing permitted for non-departmental public body
charged with oversight of non-discrimination statute to challenge inaction of government
in fulfilling European Community obligations relating to sex-discrimination); R. v. Inspec-

torate of Pollution, ex parte Greenpeace (No. 2), 4 All E.R. 329 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1994) (permitting environmental pressure group to challenge decisions relating to nuclear waste
reprocessing plant); R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ex parte World Develop-

ment Movement Ltd., 1 W.L.R. 386 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1995) (providing group lobbying for overseas aid with standing to challenge decision to fund dam project in Malaysia).
73. Order 53, supra note 66, rule 4.
74. Supreme Court Act 1981, § 31(6)(permitting the High Court to refuse leave or relief (if the application is allowed) where undue delay in bringing the application "would be
likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights of, any person
or would be detrimental to good administration.").

75. Order 53, supra note 66, rules 2-3(6).
76. WADE & FonsYrH, supra note 30, at 655.
77. Supreme Court Act 1981, §§ 31(1), (2), (4); Order 53 supra note 66, rules 1(2) and 7.
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all are available only at the discretion of the court. Ultimately, therefore, if the court has good reason for denying relief to an applicant, then
no relief will be available. The following are reasons to deny relief: the
behavior of the applicant in bringing the application out of time, or having previously acquiesced in an ultra vires decision; the nature of the
decision being one which is not suitable for judicial review; the fact that
the relief would be otiose; or, the public interest in relief not being
given. 78 In the same way that the judicial review procedure is a balance
between public and private interests, so is the availability of remedies.
Whilst the remedial and procedural aspects of judicial review are
regulated by statutory rules and judicial decisions, the actual grounds on
which judicial review are given are entirely a creation of the common
law. There have been a variety of efforts to rationalize these grounds. Of
particular note are the obiter dicta of Lord Diplock in Council of Civil
Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service79 and the report of the
Justice-All Souls Review of Administrative Law in the United
80
Kindgom.
Lord Diplock provided a classification of the grounds for judicial review into three categories-illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety. 1 Whilst this classification may be helpful in some regards, it
also has the potential to be abused by being adhered to in too rigid a
fashion. Further, by concentrating on the rectification of decisions which
are in breach of the requirement to be legal, rational and procedurally
proper, Lord Diplock's classification does not offer decision-makers any
real guidance as to what is required of them.
At the other extreme, the Justice-All Souls Review provides a detailed critique of the process of judicial review, including the procedural
and substantive aspects. As regards the latter, their report recommends
the creation of a set of Principles of Good Administration,8 2 and the imposition of a general duty to give reasons for decisions. 8 3 These would be
substantial changes to the culture of English administrative law. Currently, however, the only guidance that administrators get as to what is
acceptable in the decision-making process is derived from a close study of
78. See Lord Justice Bingham, Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary?, 1991
PUB. L. 64 for a discussion of these reasons.
79. See Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] App.
Cas. 374 (appeal taken from Eng.).
80. COMMITEE OF THE JUSTICE-ALL SOULS REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE: SoME NECESSARY REFORMS (1988) [hereinafter
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE].

81. See Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] App.
Cas. 374, 410-11 (appeal taken from Eng.).
82. ADm-STRATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 80, at 21-3.
83. ADMINISTRATwE JUSTICE, supra note 80, at 69-74.
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judicial precedent, which is far from offering a coherent body of standards. Likewise, there is no duty at common law to provide reasons for
84
decisions.
A.

WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF

JuDiciAL REVIEW?

Whatever one concludes as to whether the domain registration function is public or not, there remains a separate legal question. Do the
actions of a domain registry have a sufficiently public character to render
them suitable for judicial review? As outlined above, judicial review may
offer remedies which are not otherwise available and to parties who
would be excluded from any other form of action. Domain owners who
are concerned about the procedures used to withdraw their domain
names may find it impossible to bring an action in contract to challenge
those procedures. An application for judicial review may, therefore, be
perceived as a suitable alternative. Likewise, judicial review may offer
relief to those who do not have a contract with Nominet, such as unsuccessful domain registrants and third parties with an interest in the conduct of domain registration.
Many of the principles which are currently applied by the courts in
applications for judicial review were developed before the Order 53 process was established. Since the procedural reforms in judicial review, it
has become much more significant whether an action is brought as an
application for judicial review or by some other means in private law.
This distinction was made even more crucial by the decision of the House
of Lords in O'Reilly v. Mackman.8 5 This decision found that to allow an
action brought by writ or originating summons against a public body
raising issues of public law to continue would be an abuse of the process
of the court. Following this decision, the distinction between public law
and private law has become fundamental.8 6 The primary justification
for this distinction is that to allow actions to be brought in private law
would undermine the protections offered to public bodies by the judicial
review procedure. It has therefore become essential for those wishing to
avail themselves of judicial review principles to find some way of arguing
that the body which they are pursuing is a suitable subject for judicial
review.
In a similar way, bodies whose decisions are challenged under private law may wish to argue that the proper authority for such challenges
is Order 53, and thus that the private law challenge should be precluded.
That argument was the defendant's position in Law v. National Grey84. R. v. Higher Education Funding Council, ex parte Institute of Dental Surgery, 1

W.L.R. 242 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1994).
85. 2 App. Cas. 237 (appeal taken from Eng., 1983).
86. Harry Woolf, Public Law-PrivateLaw: Why the Divide?, 1985 PuB. L. 220.
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hound Racing Club Ltd.87 The Court of Appeals held unanimously that
the decision of a company which regulated the conduct and discipline of
greyhound racing in Britain to suspend the license of a greyhound
trainer could be challenged by way of originating summons. The basis
for this decision was that "such powers as the stewards had to suspend
the plaintiffs licence were derived from a contract between him and the
defendants."8 8 In addition, the jurisdiction of the club was voluntarythere was no compulsion to submit to its rules, and there was even a
suggestion that the club did not hold a monopoly over greyhound

racing.8 9
After the Law case, a series of decisions contributed to a set of standards which are to be applied to decide whether a body or function is
susceptible to judicial review. These standards are by no means complete, however, and some speculation is necessary to assess whether
Nominet could be judicially reviewed. The decision in R. v. Panel on
Take-Overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin90 represents a high point in
the availability of judicial review. Here, the Court of Appeal held that
the power to regulate take-overs exercised by a self-regulatory body
could be the subject of judicial review. In doing so, it relied on the nature
of the power exercised, rather than the source of that power. Indeed, the
source of the power was unclear. Lord Donaldson M.R. called the Panel
"a truly remarkable body, performing its function without visible means
of legal support."9 1 In practical terms, the decisions of the Panel were
enforced indirectly by the Stock Exchange. The Panel itself was part of a
complex and partially statutory system of merger and investment regulation, and it could be said that the decision not to create a statutory
body exercising the powers of the Panel constituted a de facto incorpora92
tion of the Panel into the government's "regulatory network."
Despite its recognition that the regulation of public power may be
more appropriate than the traditional concentration on the control of
specific powers, ex parte Datafin has not been followed in subsequent
cases. The reason for this may be found in the cases themselves. In general they have been concerned with bodies or individuals who regulate
discrete activities away from the core public functions, such as professions, 93 sports94 or religions. 9 5 It is apparent, however, that the courts
87. 1 W.L.R. 1302 (Eng. C.A. 1983).
88. Id. at 1307.
89. Id. at 1311.
90. 1 Q.B. 815 (Eng. C.A. 1987)
91. Id. at 834.
92. Id. at 835-36.
93. R. v. Lloyd's of London, exparte Briggs, 1 Lloyd's L. Rep. 176 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1993).
94. See R. v. Disciplinary Comm. of the Jockey Club, ex parte Massingberd-Mundy, 2
All E.R. 207 ( Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1993); R. v. Jockey Club, exparte RAM Racecourses Ltd., 2 All
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might look more favorably on bodies which have a more governmental
character. In R. v. Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregationsof
Great Britain & the Commonwealth, ex parte Wachmann,9 6 Simon
Brown J., reasoned that, to say of decisions of a given body that they are
public law decisions with public law consequences means something
more than that they are decisions which may be of great interest or concern to the public or, indeed, which may have consequences for the public. To attract the court's supervisory jurisdiction there "must not be
merely a public, but potentially a governmental interest in the decision97
making power in question."
Further, in R. v. Disciplinary Comm. of the Jockey Club, ex parte
Aga Khan, 98 Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. recognized that the decisions of
the Divisional Court in R. v. Disciplinary Comm. of the Jockey Club, ex
parte Massingberd-Mundy99 and R. v. DisciplinaryComm. of the Jockey
Club, ex parte RAM Racecourses Ltd., 10 0 not to allow judicial review of
the Jockey Club were bound by the precedent in Law despite the fact
that the applicants in those cases did not have a contractual relationship
with the Jockey Club. 10 1 There is a clear implication that had those decisions been appealed, the decision in Law might have been reconsidered. The door to judicial review of decisions of the Jockey Club (and by
implication other sporting bodies) was left open:
It is unnecessary for the purposes of this appeal to decide whether decisions of the Jockey Club may ever in any circumstances be challenged

by judicial review and I do not do so. Cases where the applicant or
plaintiff has no contract on which to rely may raise different considerations and the existence or non-existence of alternative remedies may
02
then be material.

Sir Thomas Bingham M.R.'s earlier remark that "if the Jockey Club
did not regulate [horse racing] the government would probably be driven
to create a public body to do so,"13 suggests that in order to ascertain
whether judicial review is appropriate courts must consider both the
E.R. 225 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1993); R. v. Football Ass'n, ex parte Football League, 2 All E.R. 833
(Q.B. Divl Ct. 1993); R. v. Disciplinary Comm. of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan 1
W.L.R 909 (Eng. C.A. 1993).
95. R. v. Chief Rabbi of the Hebrew Congregations of Great Britain and the Commonwealth, ex part Wachmann, 1 W.L.R. 1036 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1992).
96. Id. at 1041.
97. Id.
98. 1 W.L.R. 909 (Eng. C.A. 1993).
99. 2 All E.R. 207 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1998).
100. 2 All E.R. 225 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1998).
101. The judges in those cases also made it clear that their decisions would have been
different had there not been such a clear precedent. See ex parte Massingberd-Mundy, at
219; ex parte RAM Racecourses, at 246.
102. Ex parte Aga Khan, at 924.
103. Id. at 923.
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source of the specific power exercised against the applicant for judicial
review and the general source of the decision-makers authority. Where
the former is contractual, the latter may be largely irrelevant, but where
it is not contractual, the court would have to examine the place of the
decision-maker within a range of governmental activities. In those
terms, the outcome of ex parte Aga Khan is not significantly different
from that in ex parte Datafin.
What is the proper scope of judicial review? The judicial view is
clearly a conservative one: judicial review should only be available where
it is justified and where no other suitable remedy is available. Craig has
identified three separate arguments to support this view. 10 4 In the first
place, a distinction is made between public power and exercises of private power which might have public consequences. Here, control may be
exercised by some other means such as consumer protection or competition law. Secondly, the consequences of identifying an exercise of power
as public may have inappropriate consequences. Craig refers here to the
decision in the FootballAssociation1 0 5 case, where Rose J. noted that, "to
apply to the governing body of football, on the basis that it is a public
body, principles honed for the control of the abuse of power by government and its creatures would involve what, in today's fashionable parlance, would be called a quantum leap."
The third justification for restricting judicial review is caution. If
review of one sporting body is permitted, should all such bodies be reviewable? The courts have been reluctant to expand judicial review except in clearly exceptional circumstances because they are fearful of the
consequences. 10 6 This certainly explains the courts' attitude to successive challenges to the authority of the Jockey Club, but it is not particularly useful in analyzing whether a body such as Nominet should be
reviewable.
At the other extreme, some commentators take the view that judicial
review should be available wherever the public interest is threatened. In
her analysis of the application of judicial control to self-regulatory bodies, Julia Black relies heavily on theories of reflexive law. 10 7 She argues
that self-regulation has a collective aspect which is often ignored,' 0 8 especially in the courts' reaction to cases where there is a contractual relationship between the regulatory body and the regulated individual. 10 9
For Black, the judicial equation of "public" with "governmental" is inadequate, and she suggests a system of "constitutionalised autonomy"
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

P.P. CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 572 (3d ed. 1994).
2 All ER 833, 849 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1993).
CRAIG, supra note 100, at 572-3.
Julia Black, ConstitutionalisingSelf-Regulation, 59 MOD. L. REV. 24 (1996).
Id. at 27.
Id. at 40.
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within which the function a body plays in mediating between different
systems of society would be a determining factor in its publicness. 1 10 On
this analysis, judicial review of self-regulatory bodies is permissible insofar as it takes account of this more fragmented notion of the public and of
the constitutional values promoted by the social systems regulated by
such bodies and of other social systems which are affected by its
decisions.1 11
Black's argument is a tempting one, and it would be readily applicable to the processes of Internet government, which parallel those of the
nation-states within which the network finds its physical incarnation.
However, she appears to imply that the absence of judicial review in the
cases discussed equates to a complete absence of legal regulation. That
is not the case. There is a long and virtuous history of judicial control of
monopoly power. In 1787 Lord Chief Justice Hale held that a wharf
(even in private ownership) to which all vessels sailing to a particular
port had to be directed for practical reasons was thereby "affected with a
public interest." 1 12 In succeeding centuries, it became commonplace that
the common law would prevent those holding market power from charging unreasonable rates. 1 13 It may be possible to extrapolate from this a
general duty of reasonableness, which may in turn incorporate a duty to
act fairly. 114 The only obstacle to such a development is the jurisdictional distinction between public law and private law established in
O'Reilly. As noted previously, the reasons for this distinction (the protection of public bodies from inappropriate judicial intervention) are valid.
It would be better to return to the ex parte Datafin test, where the determining factor is a need for "public" control and an absence of rights or
remedies in contract or elsewhere apart from judicial review.
B.

Is

NOMINET SUSCEPTIBLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW?

Should Nominet be susceptible to judicial review? The power it exercises in administering the .uk domain is not derived from the contracts
it concludes with domain name owners, nor the consensus of Internet
users, but is delegated from IANA. In the Internet context, Nominet (in
common with the other domain registries) exercises a governmental
function. It is not, however, clear that this governmental quality can be
110. Id. at 51.
111. Id. at 52.
112. Christopher Forsyth, Of Fig Leaves and FairyTales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, the
Sovereignty of Parliamentand Judicial Review, 55 CAMBRnGE L.J. 122, 124 (1996) (citing
De Portibus Maris, 1 Harg L. Tr. (1787)).
113, P.P. Craig, Constitutions,Propertyand Regulation, 1991 PuB. L. 538 (citingAllnutt
v. Inglis, 12 East 527 (1810)). See also Breck P. McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest, 43 HARv. L. REV. 759 (1929-30).
114. Forsyth, supra note 112, at 125.
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translated into a national legal system. Instead, it is necessary to refer
to the rules of national law alone to determine whether Nominet's functions would be possible. That issue will, in turn, depend on the nature of
the dispute before the courts. Returning to the scenarios posited above,
it may be possible to arrive at some tentative conclusions.
If Nominet were to exercise its contractual power to withdraw a domain, it would appear, on the authority of ex parte Aga Khan, that the
domain name owner would be unable to apply for judicial review of that
decision. It may be possible, however, for an action in contract to be used
to require Nominet to exercise its monopoly power in a reasonable fashion. It is not the case, however, that the domain name system is a bilateral agreement between registries and domain name owners. Nominet
recognizes this fact in its domain rules, which are concerned with such
matters as the technical efficiency of the network and the expectations of
Internet users. Can Nominet be required by third parties to enforce the
"public" provisions of its own rules, the rules of netiquette, or the law? A
number of problems have to be addressed in answering that question. In
particular, there are fundamental problems with standing, appropriate
remedies and, perhaps most significantly, the place of Nominet in judicial review.
The current law relating to standing would tend in the absence of
parties whose rights are directly affected to favor applications for judicial
review brought by existing pressure groups or organizations. There are
currently three significant groups which are concerned with the regulation and operation of the Internet in the United Kingdom. Central to the
commercial organization of the Internet in the United Kingdom is the
London Internet Exchange ("LINX"), which provides a physical interconnect point for the country's major network carriers. The Internet Service
Providers Association ("ISPA') is a wider group of ISPs which exists as a
point of contact for government and other interested parties. Not all
U.K. ISPs belong to the organization, but it is a largely representative
body. A newer group, the Internet Watch Foundation ("IWF"), was established in response to public and governmental concerns about pornography on the Internet. It serves as a liaison between the police and ISPs
where allegations are made that unlawful material is being published
via Usenet or Internet. There is not, as yet, an Internet users' group in
the United Kingdom, nor a chapter of ISOC. It is likely that the courts
would recognize the standing of any of these groups to bring a wellfounded application for judicial review of Nominet's functions. Likewise,
an individual or non-Internet-related organization which otherwise had
a sufficient interest in a decision of Nominet will have standing to challenge it. However, the general public interest in Nominet's activities is
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unlikely to be sufficient to ground an application for judicial review. 1 15
Nominet may, therefore, be protected from judicial review simply by the
shortage of sufficiently interested parties.
If there is a sufficiently interested party, then the question arises as
to the appropriate remedy to be applied. Clearly this depends to an extent on what Nominet has done or failed to do. If judicial review is required to challenge a decision already taken such as the decision to
register a commercial organization under .org.uk then certiorari would
naturally be sought. If, conversely, the intention is to require Nominet
to make a decision, withdraw, or suspend a domain where, for example,
the domain is being used in a way which endangers the operation of the
DNS then mandamus would be the appropriate remedy. These remedies
are only available at the discretion of the court, however, and there have
been strong indications that the judiciary are unwilling to apply the
more coercive remedies to bodies which are not at first blush organs of
government. In ex parte Datafin, Lord Donaldson was only willing to
grant declaratory relief, adding that "the only circumstances in which I
would anticipate the use of the remedies of certiorari and mandamus
would be in the event, which I hope is unthinkable, of the panel acting in
breach of the rules of natural justice-in other words, unfairly."116 Procedural impropriety which merely amounts to a body's failure to follow
its own procedures would not attract such opprobrium.
Finally, is it likely that Nominet would fall within the substantive
boundaries ofjudicial review as understood by the courts? The functions
it performs do have a regulatory character, but they are also part of the
governance of the Internet. That in itself will not be sufficient to justify
the intervention of judicial review. In addition, there is a question of
legitimacy which will be considered later. The authorities suggest that a
national governmental interest is necessary before the courts will exercise their supervisory jurisdiction. Is there such an interest? Two factors suggest that there is. In the first place, the central authority in the
Internet, IANA, which is responsible for the delegation of national TLDs,
has clearly assumed that national domains are administered on behalf of
the nation, even if the national government itself is not responsible for
that administration.1 1 7 It may be assumed from this that where there is
no private or commercial interest in administering a national TLD, the
relevant government will do so. The second factor is that the Internet
has become an essential part of the infrastructure for commerce and gov115. See R. v. Secretary of State for the Env't, exparte Rose Theatre Trust Co., 504 (Q.B.
1990) (discussing an organization created to protect site of Shakespearean theater has no
standing to challenge the decision not to schedule the site as an ancient monument).
116. R. v. Panel on Take-Overs & Mergers, exparte Datafin, 1 Q.B. 815, 842 (Eng. C.A.
1987).
117. Jon Postel, supra note 9.
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ernment alike. Even if there were no assumption on the part of the Internet institutions that domain registration should be a governmental
activity, the fact that the Internet itself has become so central to commercial and other activities suggests that in the event of the failure of
the domain registry the government would undertake to replace its function. If Nominet did not exist, the government would have to find an
alternative independent registry, or fulfill the registration function directly. On that basis, Nominet is probably more governmental than the
Disciplinary Commission of the Jockey Club.
If the conditions are right, then, there is a very strong argument
that Nominet (or whomever fulfills the domain registration function in
the United Kingdom) is susceptible to judicial review. With that in
mind, it is to be expected that the decisions Nominet takes should consider the public nature of the function, and not simply regard registration as a contractual matter.
VI. WHAT IS THE PROPER FUNCTION OF NATIONAL COURTS
WITH REGARD TO INTERNET INSTITUTIONS?
There remains a final problem. Is the control of Internet constitutional functions by national courts legitimate? Nominet performs a function for which it is responsible to two separate groups. In the first place,
it is one of a large number of top-level domain registries. All these registries are collectively responsible for the efficient operation of the DNS. It
is not open to any individual registry to take decisions which would
threaten the DNS. That is a global matter-it makes no sense to talk of
the United Kingdom's DNS, since Internet users anywhere in the world
need to have access to sites in the .uk domain on the same basis as they
do to sites in their own domains. All registries do, however, have responsibilities to the domain owners with whom they have contracted. Further, national registries may have responsibilities to the nation, whether
or not that is expressed as a responsibility to government. A tension
may arise between national interests and the public interest in regard to
the Internet. This tension is most likely to arise where a national government wishes to control Internet access or content. It will also occur
where a national court requires a registry to behave in a particular fashion notwithstanding its responsibility to the wider Internet community.
If different national courts and governments make decisions relating to
the Internet without considering the needs of the network itself, then it
is likely that the network will become fragmented.
National control of Internet institutions may therefore be problematic from the point of view of the network itself. There may also be a
problem from the national perspective. Does the continual reference to
"governmental" action in the cases on the availability of judicial review

1997]

DOMAIN NAMING AND NOMINET

conceal a judicial assumption that the courts may only address state action. Nominet functions within a non-state "constitution" and it may
therefore be more appropriate for public law disputes to be resolved
within that framework. This would also have the advantage that disparity of norms would be reduced. However, there is currently no comprehensive dispute resolution process within the Internet system, despite
the fact that other organs of governance can be identified.1 1 8 In the absence of such a process national courts may find themselves faced with
Internet-related disputes increasingly often. A strict reading of the requirement for national governmental interest would exclude such disputes from judicial review, although it would still be possible to resolve
some of them as a matter of private law where appropriate.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Despite these caveats about the legitimacy of national judicial intervention in Internet-related disputes, it remains that Nominet may reasonably be expected to fulfill a public role in the operation of the national
domain registry and that it may, given an appropriate situation, be subjected to judicial review of this public function. In at least one state,
therefore, it is possible that the existing rules of administrative law may
be applied to this new form of human organization. At one level this is
simply a reaffirmation of the adaptive power of the law. From the perspective of the domain registry, however, exercise of the judicial power to
regulate its work may well be an unwanted intrusion. Even if one accepts that some form of regulation of domain registration is necessary
and may actually protect registries from the consequences of resolving
disputes in which they have no interest, it is reasonable to question
whether the haphazard nature of such regulation is in the best interests
of a developing global communications medium. Just as John Donne recognized our collective interest in the well-being of individuals, 119 the
regulation of a part of the Internet has an impact on all Internet users.
This is not to say that national regulation of the Internet, whether by
judges or politicians, is never acceptable. Such an attitude would be unreasonable. If, however, such regulation is undertaken purely by reference to national interests and traditions and without proper
consideration of the functions of the network and the desires, however
118. See Gould, supra note 42.
119. John Donne, Devotions XVII, in CoMPLETE POETRY AND SELECTED PROSE 537, 538

(John Hayward ed., 1990) (1624) ("No man is an illand, intire of it selfe; every man is a
peece of the Continent, a part of the main; if a Clod bee washed away by the Sea, Europe is
the lesse, as well as if a Promontorie were, as well as if a Mannor of thy friends or of thine
owne were; any mans death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankind; And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.").
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inchoate, of the global Internet community, then it is unlikely to be regarded as legitimate.
When it comes, the decision whether it is possible for judicial review
to be available against decisions of Nominet should not be taken simply
by analogizing with stock-market and sporting regulators. Rather, it
should also be properly founded in an understanding of the place of the
domain registry within the structure of the Internet. Paradoxically, that
understanding may well provide a better foundation for judicial review
than the existing authorities.

